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AN UNFORTUNATE COINCIDENCE: JEWS, JEWISHNESS, 
AND ENGLISH LAW, by Didi Herman 1
MARTIN LOCKSHIN 2
ARE JEWS TREATED FAIRLY in today’s courts in the West? Most of us would 
answer in the affi  rmative without a second thought. But a new, well-documented, 
and provocative book by Didi Herman, Professor of Law and Social Change at 
the University of Kent in England, An Unfortunate Coincidence: Jews, Jewishness, 
and English Law, raises some serious doubts about the way that Jews have been 
and continue to be treated in English courts.
Herman analyzes dozens of cases involving disparate areas of law from 
the twentieth century and one famous case from the twenty-fi rst. She argues 
that judges often have shown a shocking lack of sympathy when faced with 
discrimination against Jews. Th e book takes its title from a 1998 case3 where 
a Jew and a non-Jew were on trial for handling stolen goods.4 Th e prosecution 
claimed in its summary that the Jewish defendant was 
the most self-regarding, utterly cynical, greedy man, you can’t believe a word he 
says… . A master of deceit… . I draw an analogy with Oliver Twist who is seen in the 
musical where Fagin … goes through all the money and the lolly and the jewels … be-
cause like Fagin he is keeping his hands on his own material … he is very similar… .5
Th e Jewish defendant’s counsel complained that the speech was “racially 
and religiously off ensive” and that, accordingly, his client had been denied a fair 
1. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 193 pages.
2. Professor, Department of Humanities, York University.
3. Herman, supra note 1 (discussing the unreported case R v Elias (15 December 1998), (CA 
(UK)) [Elias]).
4. Herman, supra note 1 at 45-46.
5. Herman, ibid at 46; Elias, supra note 3.
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trial.6 Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal rejected this argument. Th e 
fact that the jury found only the Jewish defendant guilty proved nothing, the 
Court of Appeal ruled. Th e court held that Crown counsel’s “fusillade of insults” 
did not exceed “the permissible limits of advocacy,”7 and that it was simply “an 
unfortunate coincidence” that the Jewish defendant who was found guilty had 
been compared to Fagin, Dickens’ Jew in Oliver Twist.8 Th e trial judge said that 
he had thought the defendant (named Misha Chaim Baruch Elias) “might be 
Jewish,” but since the point of his Jewishness had not been made at trial, no clear 
case existed to prove that the jury had heard a discriminatory charge.9
Another example of indiff erence to discrimination against Jews comes, 
less surprisingly, from a 1947 case.10 Jewish refugees from the Holocaust were 
stopped by British authorities as they attempted to enter Palestine on the ship, the 
President Warfi eld.11 Th e Jewish Agency retained a noted lawyer to apply for a writ 
of habeas corpus, alleging that the Jewish refugees were being unlawfully detained 
at sea by the British government. As many will remember, the writ was denied.12 
Herman notes that the judge did not even mention the fact that the detainees 
on the ship had just survived the horrors of the Holocaust, nor that most of 
them were essentially stateless refugees13 (the decision simply refers to them as 
“immigrants”).14 In fact, nowhere in the decision did the judge even mention that 
the detainees were Jewish (although the judge did refer to the local “champions” 
of these “immigrants” as “the Jews”).15 Neither did the judge consider the irony 
of the fact that the British authorities were taking the ‘immigrants’ on the ship 
against their will to Germany.16
A few times in the book Herman notes that in the last three or four decades, 
a number of claims have been fi led under the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA) 





10. Ibid at 103-04; R v Secretary of State for Foreign Aff airs, ex parte Greenberg, [1947] 2 All 
ER 550, 14 ILR 69 Ch [Greenberg].
11. Th e case is well-known; the President Warfi eld was renamed the Exodus by its Jewish crew.
12. Herman, supra note 1 at 103-104.
13. Ibid at 106.
14. Ibid; Greenberg, supra note 10 at 556.
15. Herman, ibid; Greenberg, ibid at 551.
16. Herman, ibid.
17. Ibid at 138-42; Race Relations Act 1976 (UK), c 74; and Race Relations Amendment Act 2000 
(UK), c 34.
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famous case in 2007 (Jewish Free School (JFS); more on that case below), and the 
only party ever found guilty of racial discrimination against a Jew under the RRA 
was an Orthodox Jewish school!18
Herman’s argument is even stronger than this. Not only have English 
courts been insensitive to discrimination against Jews, they have also tolerated 
and adopted discriminatory attitudes themselves. For example, in 1922, a court 
supported an insurance company’s decision not to honour a claim on the policy 
of a Jewish client who had suff ered a burglary.19 Th e court ruled that the client 
had not disclosed an allegedly relevant fact on his application for insurance—he 
had failed to list the name that he had been known under in Romania before 
he immigrated to England. Th e court accepted the argument that the insurance 
company might well have refused to insure the client, named Harry Horne, had 
they realized that he was born under the name Euda Gedale and had lived in 
Romania until age twelve.20 Court documents describe Harry/Euda as the son 
of a “Hebrew teacher.”21 As the court wrote, “It is impossible to say that matters 
such as nationality, caste and early domicil cannot be of importance in judging as 
to the risk that underwriters run in entering into such a contract.”22
Not quite as egregious as the suggestion that a Jewish background is 
reasonable grounds for denying insurance is the judicial claim that Jewish identity 
is essentially so strange as to be unknowable. Courts in many countries struggle 
with the question of the validity of conditions in wills stipulating that an heir will 
inherit only if he or she remains or marries within the faith. Various grounds have 
been used to void such conditions. Herman dedicates a whole chapter to this 
issue, concentrating much of her discussion on decisions from the early 1940s.23 
In one decision, an English court struggled with the validity of a will’s provision 
that the benefi ciaries would inherit provided that they did not “contract a 
marriage with a person who is not of Jewish parentage and of the Jewish faith.”24 
Th e House of Lords (acting then in its role as the court of last resort) supported 
the trial judge, who had ruled that such language was overly vague and that no 
clear meaning could be attached to the phrases “of Jewish parentage” or “of the 
18. R (E) v Governing Body of JFS, [2008] EWHC 1535 (Admin), [2008] ELR 445 Ch [JFS, 
Ch], rev’d (2009), [2009] EWCA Civ 626, 4 All ER 375 (CA) [JFS, CA], rev’d (2010), 
[2009] UKSC 1, IRLR 136 (UKSC) [JFS, UKSC].
19. Herman, supra note 1 at 33-34; Horne v Poland, [1922] 2 KB 364, 38 TLR 357 Ch [Horne].
20. Herman, ibid at 34; Horne, ibid at 366.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Herman, ibid at 50.
24. Ibid at 54; Re Samuel, Jacobs v Ramsden, [1941] 1 All ER 539 Ch [Re Samuel].
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Jewish faith.”25 One of the Lords explained that he was sure that “the testator 
meant no more than that the husband should be of Hebraic blood. But what 
degree of Hebraic blood would a permissible husband have to possess? … Th ese 
are questions to which no answer has been furnished by the testator. … [T]he 
condition is voided for uncertainty.”26 As Herman notes, the testator had made 
no reference at all to “blood,” but the judges assumed that Jewish identity had to 
be blood-based.27 Herman also notes that in these very same years English courts 
had no problem enforcing a condition in a will stipulating that a benefi ciary 
had to be “a Protestant in religion and a whole hearted believer in the Deity of 
Christ.”28 Th e courts felt that this language was not vague, but they felt that the 
phrases “of Jewish parentage” and “of the Jewish faith” were.
Herman cites many more cases and categories of law to show that these 
judicial attitudes to Jews in English courts persisted into more modern times. 
Readers will come to their own conclusions about the strength of her evidence. 
I was generally convinced, but felt that a small number of the arguments were 
stretching the point. Nevertheless, the main thesis of the book deserves attention: 
Herman’s claim that judges in the English system often used “racialist” and 
“Orientalist” thinking towards Jews, and understood them through the lens of 
Christianity, not in their own terms.29
Herman’s strongest argument for the persistence of this approach into the 
twenty-fi rst century is from the JFS case, which made great waves in the United 
Kingdom and in Jewish communities around the world. She dedicates two full 
chapters to this case.30
Th e rules of the Jewish Free School [the “school”] stipulated that the Offi  ce 
of the Chief Rabbi (OCR) of the United Kingdom had the right to determine 
who was Jewish and thus eligible for admission to the school. Th e claimant in 
JFS was a Jewish man alleging racial discrimination against his ex-wife and son; 
she was a convert to Judaism and the son was denied admission to the school. 
Th e school argued that they had denied the son admission on religious grounds 
and on the advice of the OCR, who did not feel that the child passed the test of 
being Jewish since his mother’s conversion had allegedly been done in an invalid 
25. Herman, ibid at 55; Re Samuel, ibid at 542-43.
26. Herman, ibid at 56; Clayton and another v Ramsden and others, [1943] 1 ALL ER 16, [1943] 
AC 320 HL (Eng) at 22.
27. Herman, ibid.
28. Ibid at 57-58; Re Mylne, Potter v Dow, [1941] 1 All ER 405, 57 TLR 311 Ch.
29. Herman, ibid at 15.
30. Ibid at 126, 157.
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way.31 (Th e issue of validity of conversions is a source of great tension within the 
contemporary Jewish community worldwide.) Th e trial judge ruled in favour of 
the school,32 but on appeal to the new Supreme Court (which replaced the House 
of Lords), the school was found guilty of racial discrimination and now has to 
use a diff erent criterion for determining the eligibility of students for admission.33
It was not really the policies of the school but rather the Jewish defi nition of who 
is a Jew—a defi nition that has been in use for at least two thousand years (namely, 
a person whose mother is Jewish, or who converted in a valid conversion)—that 
the Court ruled to be discriminatory and racist.34 As Herman explains, this decision 
makes sense only if Jewishness is racialized (i.e., if Jews are understood to be a 
race).35 Only then one could argue that the claimant’s son was a victim of racial 
discrimination. But if, as any serious scholar would argue, Jews are not a race, then 
the school was simply applying a religious test to its potential students.
Herman shows that some of the judges of the Court failed to understand 
Judaism in its own terms. Lady Hale, one of the then seven Supreme Court 
justices, noted that “[t]he Christian Church will admit children regardless of 
who their parents are” and assumed that Jewish schools ought to do the same.36 
Herman also notes that most of the Court failed to understand the most basic 
aspects of Jewish identity. For example, some of those judges alleged that the 
mother of this potential student had suff ered discrimination because she was 
Italian and not Jewish—as if it were impossible to be both Italian and Jewish!37 
As Herman concludes, “One of the ironies of the JFS decision is that as the court 
calls the school a racial discriminator, the judges themselves indulge in some 
of the clumsiest racial discrimination we have seen amongst the cases discussed 
in this book.”38 (Herman makes it fairly clear that she is not a supporter of the 
school’s old admissions policy, but she strenuously objects to the way that the 
Court ruled against it.)39 In summary, Herman makes a convincing case for the 
claim that Jews have often been given unfair treatment in English courts. But 
why is this the case?
31. Ibid at 149-50.
32. Ibid at 151; JFS, Ch, supra note 18.
33. Herman, ibid at 161-62; JFS, UKSC, supra note 18 at para 66.
34. Herman, ibid at 166.
35. Ibid at 167.
36. Ibid at 157, 168; JFS, UKSC, supra note 18 at para 69.
37. Herman, ibid at 161; JFS, UKSC, ibid at para 66.
38. Herman, ibid at 165.
39. Ibid at 162.
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Since I am a scholar of Jewish Studies, not of law, it is this last question that 
intrigued me as I read the book. Herman makes it clear in the beginning of the 
book that she would avoid as much as possible using the term “antisemitism” in 
her analysis, apparently because she sees the term as politically charged.40 She 
claims that she is following the pattern of “critical Jewish Studies” scholars who, 
she says, avoid that term.41 She suggests that the type of problems that she is 
identifying in English legal decisions about Jews may well apply to any minority 
in England that is perceived as deviating from the accepted pattern of secular—
i.e., Christian—behaviour.42
Some people understand antisemitism as simply one manifestation of 
the common antipathy to the “other.” Th at is certainly part of the story. For 
example, the Chief Rabbi of England, Lord Jonathan Sacks, writes in a 2011 
book: “Anti-Semitism, the ‘oldest hatred,’ is ultimately dislike of the unlike—the 
fear mutating into hate of the stranger. … Anti-Semitism, though it begins with 
Jews, never ends with Jews. It is the paradigm case of the hatred of diff erence.”43
But scholars of antisemitism also outline a very particular aspect of this 
discrimination that has arguably been endemic to Western countries in many 
diff erent forms for the last two millennia, and which has led to the killing 
of the largest number of members of any minority group in the West in the 
twentieth century.
Here and there in Herman’s analysis we see hints that she has identifi ed 
a specifi cally anti-Jewish animus at work in English society and its judiciary. 
Consider one of her points about an aspect of the Court’s JFS decision: the 
assumption that no religious group can self-defi ne even in part on the basis 
of a person’s birth, as such a criterion would be, by defi nition, racist. Herman 
astutely notes: 
Pauline Christianity placed itself against a Jewish notion of ‘inherited con-
tract,’ replacing it with a diff erent narrative—one about consent. In JFS we 
can see the same dynamics at play. Th e judges cut off  the Jewish story, labelling 
it blood-based and therefore ‘racial,’ replacing it with a Christian myth of indi-
viduality and autonomy.  Th is is the rejection of Judaism at the heart of Chris-
tian … supersessionary … discourse. Th e fact that non-Jews have been wel-
comed into Jewishness through conversion for well over 2,000 years … does 
not fi t the Christian triumphalist narrative, and so the judges simply ignore it.44
40. Ibid at 25.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid at 24, 26.
43. Koren Sacks Rosh HaShana Mahzor, translated by Jonathan Sacks (Jerusalem: Koren 
Jerusalem, 2011) at 450.
44. Herman, supra note 1 at 167.
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Just as we fi nd a troubling tendency in some right-wing circles to exaggerate 
the amount of antisemitism in the West today, so too is there an equally troubling 
tendency on the Left to avoid calling antisemitism by its name. While antisemitism 
is not the most dangerous form of discrimination in Western countries today, it 
does exist, and it is disconcerting that Herman is loath to use the word. Th e 
evidence she presents in this book goes beyond what she writes in the opening 
pages: “What I have found in the cases [discussed in this book] is not ‘hatred,’ 
but distaste, not ‘malice’ but unease and confusion.”45 I think she has found more 
than that: the persistence of long-standing and discriminatory anti-Jewish beliefs, 
some of which originated in supersessionist Christianity and have since become 
secularized. Th ese beliefs have been adopted by too many judges on the bench 
in England. 
In any case, Herman should be given credit for producing a fascinating book 
based on wide-ranging research, which is accessible to any intelligent reader and 
which provides us with food for thought.
45. Ibid at 25.
